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The development of the “Copyleft” and open source movement has thrown copyright law for a loop.  There have 
been some questions about the legality of open 
source products, including those that use the 
GNU General Public License.  However, two 
recent cases have affirmed the legality of the 
open source movement.  In part I, I discussed 
the case of Wallace	v.	IBM,1 a 2006 case in 
which the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals found 
that the GNU General Public License was 
not a violation of antitrust law.  However, that 
did not completely settle the copyright and 
copyleft question.  This month’s column will 
discuss the 2008 case of Jacobsen	
v.	Katzer,2 which was (unusually) 
decided by the Court of Appeals for 
the Federal Circuit.
Jacobsen	 v.	 Katzer sought to 
determine whether a copyright 
holder can have his/her cake and 
eat it too.  The key issue of this case 
was whether authors who use the 
alternative system are still covered 
by copyright, or whether they have 
really given up all rights to their 
work.  In other words, have they inadvertently 
placed their work in the public domain?  In 
August 2008, we received an answer to this 
question from the Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit.
The Origins of Jacobsen	v.	Katzer
This case concerned software for model 
train hobbyists.  Robert Jacobsen is a software 
designer in California.  He created software 
to program chips for model trains, which was 
distributed under the Artistic license.  Jacob-
sen’s license specifically indicated that future 
“downstream” modifications must themselves 
be subject to the same Artistic license 
terms as the original.  However, KAM 
Industries modified the software and 
began to sell it commercially 
under the exclusive rights 
of copyright.  Because the 
software involved the 
programming of chips 
which ran trains, 
KAM also obtained 
a utility patent for 
the mechanical por-
tion of their prod-
uct.
Jacobsen filed 
a lawsuit in Federal 
court in the Northern 
District of California for violation of copyright 
and breach of contract.  He also sought a 
declaratory judgment that KAM’s patent was 
invalid.  In addition, the plaintiff requested 
a preliminary injunction to stop KAM from 
distributing their software.  While agreeing 
that Jacobsen had a valid claim under contract 
law, the District Court ruled that the language 
of the Artistic license was so broad as to be 
unenforceable under copyright law.  This was 
a major blow for Jacobsen because of the rules 
regarding preliminary injunctions.
Standards for Preliminary  
Injunctions
An injunction is an equitable court order 
that commands a party “to do or to abstain 
from doing a particular action.  The purpose 
... is to preclude the occurrence of a threat-
ened wrong or injury as well as to prevent 
future violations.”3  This can take the form 
of a temporary restraining order (TRO), a 
preliminary injunction, or a permanent in-
junction.  A TRO is “a temporary order of 
a court to keep conditions as they are (like 
not taking a child out of the county or not 
selling marital property) until there can be a 
hearing in which both parties are present.”4 
Once both parties are present, the court may 
issue a preliminary injunction.  After final 
disposition of the case, the judge may then 
order a permanent injunction.5  In intellectual 
property cases, injunctions usually take the 
form of prohibiting the infringing party from 
continuing their infringement.  Because a 
preliminary injunction is issued before final 
disposition, courts must weigh carefully the 
costs and benefits of using this remedy.  Courts 
typically use the following test for whether to 
issue a preliminary injunction:
(1)  Whether the plaintiff will probably 
succeed on the merits;
(2)  Whether irreparable harm to the 
plaintiff would result if the injunction 
is not granted;
(3)  The balance of harms between the 
plaintiff and defendant if the injunction 
is allowed; and
(4)  Whether the injunction will have an 
impact on the public interest.6
While preliminary injunctions are heav-
ily used in intellectual property cases, they 
are not appropriate for breach of contract 
claims.  The appropriate remedy for breaching 
a contract is payment of monetary damages. 
There is no presumption of irreparable harm 
in contract law.  Thus, the district court’s 
decision precluding Jacobsen’s copyright 
claim meant that he was not entitled to obtain 
a preliminary injunction.
Why This Court?
One of the most unusual features of the 
Jacobsen case was the court that heard the 
appeal.  The Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit was created in 1982 when Congress 
merged the Court of Customs and Patent Ap-
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back seats paying attention to only their books 
or games where we were full of questions as 
youth.  Can it be that the growing technology 
in this world has stricken us with a non-com-
municative group of young adults?  I fear that 
relying on computers, ipods, and a myriad of 
games has led us to a more non-reactive group 
of people who will have a lot of trouble manag-
ing others and communicating a professional 
passion and ethic to their patrons in whatever 
venue they choose to work.  I wonder if this 
isn’t an area that needs our special attention? 
I am trying to volunteer some hours to com-
municate with new professionals.  How about 
you?  Is it worth our efforts, even at confer-
ences, to communicate our “joie de vivre” to 
others?  
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peals with the appellate division of the U.S. 
Court of Claims.  This nationwide appellate 
court has jurisdiction over cases involving 
international trade, patents, trademarks, and 
appeals of some administrative agencies, as 
well as claims of monetary damage against the 
Federal government.  However, the appellate 
jurisdiction of the court is also limited to only 
those specific types of cases.7  Since copyright 
is not one of the areas of law that are specifi-
cally assigned to the Federal Circuit, the only 
copyright cases they hear are ones which arise 
under patent or trademark law.  Otherwise, the 
court does not have proper appellate jurisdic-
tion and can’t hear the case.8
The only reason why the Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit was able to hear the 
Jacobsen case was because of his declaratory 
judgment action to declare KAM’s patent in-
valid.  As a result, the case arose under patent 
law, and the Federal Circuit ruled that it had 
jurisdiction to hear the case.  While somewhat 
controversial, the Federal Circuit’s ruling is 
based on both case law and the original statute 
enabling the court.9
The Ruling of the Court
As with any other type of intellectual 
property, copyright may be licensed.  This can 
be done through exclusive or nonexclusive 
licenses.  When a copyright owner grants a 
nonexclusive license, he or she waives the abil-
ity to sue for copyright infringement.  After all, 
the user is covered by a license.  Under those 
circumstances, it makes sense that the correct 
remedy would be a contract infringement case 
for breaching the agreement.  But if the use is 
pursuant to a license that is limited in scope, 
and if the user acts outside the scope of the 
license, the copyright owner can in fact sue 
for copyright infringement.10  So the important 
question is whether the Artistic license is a con-
dition of the license, or merely a covenant (a 
term of a contract).  As mentioned above, pre-
liminary injunctions are available for copyright 
cases but not for breach of contract claims.
The court began its analysis by reviewing 
the plain words of the Artistic license: “The 
intent of this document is to state the condi-
tions under which a Package may be copied.”11 
(Emphasis added by court.)  The opinion also 
noted other ways in which the terminology 
of the Artistic license is in accordance with 
conditional language: “The Artistic license 
also uses the traditional language of condi-
tions by noting that the rights to copy, modify, 
and distribute are granted ‘provided that’ the 
conditions are met. Under California contract 
law, ‘provided that’ typically denotes a condi-
tion.”12  The plain language on the face of the 
document therefore appears to state conditions. 
“Copyright licenses are designed to support the 
right to exclude; money damages alone do not 
support or enforce that right.”13  The opinion 
goes on to state:
In this case, a user who downloads the 
JMRI copyrighted materials is autho-
rized to make modifications and to dis-
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tribute the materials “provided that” the 
user follows the restrictive terms of the 
Artistic license.  A copyright holder can 
grant the right to make certain modifica-
tions, yet retain his right to prevent other 
modifications.  Indeed, such a goal is 
exactly the purpose of adding conditions 
to a license grant.  The Artistic license, 
like many other common copyright 
licenses, requires that any copies that 
are distributed contain the copyright 
notices and the COPYING file. ... It is 
outside the scope of the Artistic license 
to modify and distribute the copyrighted 
materials without copyright notices and 
a tracking of modifications from the 
original computer files.  If a downloader 
does not assent to these conditions stated 
in the COPYING file, he is instructed 
to “make other arrangements with the 
Copyright Holder.”  Katzer/Kamind 
did not make any such “other arrange-
ments.”
The court therefore ruled that the Artistic 
license constitutes a condition of the grant of 
rights.  “Copyright holders who engage in open 
source licensing have the right to control the 
modification and distribution of copyrighted 
material.”14  This is not a mere contract term; 
this language is part and parcel of the condi-
tions for licensing use of the material. 
The precedential value of this opinion is 
that a creator who uses an open source license 
does not give up his or her rights to the mate-
rial. Katzer had argued that Jacobsen had 
donated his work to the public domain when 
he gave it away without charging.  However, 
the court agreed with Jacobsen that he had 
in fact granted a conditional license, just as 
any copyright holder may do.  Any use that 
is beyond the conditions listed in the license 
(such as selling the work for profit) is outside 
the scope of the granted rights.  Therefore, us-
ing an open source license does not invalidate 
the underlying copyright, and not abiding 
by the stated terms will constitute copyright 
infringement.
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Cir-
cuit is an unusual place for a major copyright 
decision.  However, because there was a patent 
claim involved, the court had proper jurisdic-
tion to hear the case.  Those who support the 
copyleft and open source movement can take 
heart that this strongly-worded decision.  In 
the first scholarly article to analyze this recent 
case,15 law professor Brian Fitzgerald and his 
co-author Rami Olwan sum up the situation 
as follows:
This is a landmark decision because 
it confirms that free and open source 
software copyright licences [sic]16 
and by analogy open content licences 
that are similar in style to the Artistic 
licence are:
1)  copyright licences;
2)  which impose licence con-
ditions which if not satisfied 
can found an action in and the 
grant of remedies for copyright 
infringement; and 
3)  are legally enforceable.
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